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Interest of the Amici Curiae
Amici are law professors who teach and have written extensively on
trademark law. Amici have no stake in the outcome of this case.2 Our sole interest
in this case is in the orderly development of trademark law in a way that serves the
public interest by promoting competition and protecting free expression.

Source of Authority of Amici Curiae to File
Appellants/Cross-Appellees consented to the filing of this brief, but
Appellee/Cross-Appellant did not. Therefore, a motion for leave of Court to file
this brief is submitted herewith in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 29(a).

2

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no such
counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or
submission of this brief. No person other than amici curiae or their counsel made
a monetary contribution intended to fund its preparation or submission.
1

Summary of the Argument
The District Court properly held that New Life Art’s (“New Life”) creative
works do not infringe the University of Alabama’s (“the University”) rights in the
trade dress of its football uniforms, including the their crimson and white colors.
First, New Life’s realistic depiction of the University’s football games is not likely
to confuse consumers about the source of New Life’s goods, or as to the
University’s sponsorship of or affiliation with those goods. Confusion is
actionable under the Lanham Act only when it relates to these types of source
relationships, and not when consumers merely recognize the plaintiff’s mark.
Second, even if some amount of confusion about a relationship between the
University and New Life did exist, that confusion would be irrelevant if it was
unlikely to affect consumers’ decisions to purchase art from New Life Art. Third,
the District Court rightly held that the University’s football uniforms and colors are
aesthetically functional as used by New Life. Fourth, and finally, New Life’s
expressive works are protected under the First Amendment and cannot be deemed
infringing.
Argument
I.

The District Court Correctly Found that Confusion is Unlikely
A. Only Confusion Relating to the Source, Sponsorship, or Affiliation of
New Life’s Works is Actionable

2

The District Court properly rejected the University’s sweeping assertion that
Moore’s realistic renditions of notable football plays violate the University’s
trademark rights simply because consumers will recognize the uniforms depicted
in Moore’s paintings as those of Alabama’s football team. To the extent the
District Court concluded that any image of University events inherently created
some possibility of confusion simply because the University's uniforms were
correctly depicted, it was relying on outdated readings of Boston Professional
Hockey v. Dallas Cap and Emblem Manufacturing, 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975)
and University of Georgia Athletic Association v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir.
1985), readings that have been repudiated by the Fifth Circuit and are inconsistent
with subsequent Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit cases. This court should
correct that mistake.
The University argues, and the District Court partially accepted, that New
Life’s works are likely to cause confusion because the uniforms depicted in
Moore’s paintings were the “triggering mechanism” for a sale.3 This claim,
however, ignores the fact that the Lanham Act requires a focus on the source of the
goods at issue. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). The plain language of section 43(a)
limits claims to uses that are likely to cause confusion of very particular types,
specifically confusion as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such

3

Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 28.
3

person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.” 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(A). And this court has made the focus on the source of goods clear.
“Our cases have established two elements that [plaintiff] had to prove to merit
injunctive relief under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act: (1) that it has trademark rights
in the mark or name at issue; and (2) that the defendant adopted a mark or name
that was the same, or confusingly similar to the plaintiff's mark, such that there was
a likelihood of confusion for consumers as to the proper origin of the goods created
by the defendant's use of the [mark] in his trade.” Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743
F.2d 1508, 1512 (11th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).4
It is no accident that trademark law focuses tightly on confusion regarding
the source of goods.5 It does so because the purpose of trademark law, in contrast
with patent and copyright, is not to reward innovation or creativity. See TrafFix
Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001) (“The Lanham Act
does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation …”). Instead,

4

Amici Curiae University of Arkansas et al. (collectively “University Amici”)
mischaracterize this fundamental principle of trademark law, claiming “[a] bedrock
principle of trademark law is an owner’s right of control the use of its marks.”
Amicus at 5. Notwithstanding their desire to control all uses of their marks,
trademark owners have never had such plenary control. Setting aside dilution,
which is not at issue here, mark owners are entitled only to control uses of a mark
that are likely to confuse consumers about the source of another’s goods.
5
We use “source” here to include all the source relationships iterated in section
43(a) – source, sponsorship, affiliation, etc.
4

trademark law is intended to facilitate the operation of a competitive marketplace
by preventing sellers from misrepresenting to consumers who is responsible for
products or services. Id. (“by preventing competitors from copying a sourceidentifying mark, [trademark law] reduce[s] the customer's costs of shopping and
making purchasing decisions, and helps assure a producer that it (and not an
imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated
with a desirable product”) (internal quotations omitted). Hence, the limited nature
of trademark rights is not some antiquated legal doctrine; it derives from the core
purpose of trademark law.
Boston Hockey and Laite departed from these principles in suggesting that
trademark infringement could occur when consumers are confused as to the source
of a trademark, rather than the product bearing that mark. Most courts after Boston
Hockey and Laite have realized, however, that those cases were inconsistent with
trademark law’s purposes and have construed the cases narrowly. In Kentucky
Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., for example, the court
expressly declined to read Boston Hockey as doing away with the confusion
requirement, noting that the plaintiff’s singular emphasis on the “certain
knowledge that the [plaintiff was the] source and origin of the trademark symbols”
pressed Boston Hockey too far. 549 F.2d 368, 389 (5th Cir. 1977) (“By
emphasizing this one phrase from our comprehensive opinion, Boston Hockey
5

could therefore be read to dispose of the confusion issue here. We decline,
however, to adopt that reading. Boston Hockey also reiterated our unbroken
insistence on a showing of confusion, and we believe that our opinion must be read
in that context.”). See also Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J. H.
Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d 1079, 1082 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining that even
post-Boston Hockey “a claimant must still prove a likelihood of confusion, mistake
or deceit of ‘typical’ purchasers, or potential purchasers, as to the connection of the
trademark owner with the infringing product”) (emphasis added).
Likewise, trademark law’s unquestioned approval of truthful comparative
advertising and advertising of replacement parts demonstrates that the only
actionable “triggering mechanism” is consumers’ belief that the plaintiff is the
source of the defendant’s goods. Were this not so, comparative advertising that
informed consumers of the existence of generic versions of branded drugs would
be infringing, since there would be a causal relationship between the use of the
mark and consumers’ choice of the generic. See 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 25:52 (4th ed. 2010) (explaining U.S. law’s

preference for informing consumers through truthful comparisons even if that
diverts business from the trademark owner). Indeed, comparative advertising can
even take the form of similar trade dress, so long as it is not so similar it causes
source confusion. McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 511
6

F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2007) (contrasting noninfringing and infringing store-brand
packaging). Similarly with replacement parts: without using the trademark, the
seller can’t identify its own goods, and thus there is a causal relationship between
use of the mark and the sale. Cf. B.H. Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement Parts Co.,
451 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir.1971) (approving truthful claims about replacement parts).
The causation/triggering mechanism argument only holds when it is based on
source confusion. See Custom Mfg. and Engineering, Inc. v. Midway Services,
Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 647 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Unlike the general prohibition against
unauthorized copying that exists in patent and copyright law, the touchstone of
liability in a trademark infringement action is not simply whether there is
unauthorized use of a protected mark, but whether such use is likely to cause
consumer confusion.”).
If there was any remaining doubt that the confusion inquiry must focus on
the source of goods, it was relieved by the Supreme Court in Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). Like this case, Dastar
involved a claim that the content of a creative work implicitly suggested the source
of that work. Specifically, Twentieth Century Fox argued that use of footage from
Twentieth Century Fox’s television series without attribution falsely suggested that
Dastar was the source of the content. Id. at 27. The Supreme Court rejected that
claim, declaring it “out of accord with the history and purpose of the Lanham Act
7

and inconsistent with precedent.” Id. at 32. The Lanham Act does not address
claims about the source of creative work, or components thereof; it focuses only on
confusion regarding the source of goods. Id. at 39 (“We do not think the Lanham
Act requires this search for the source of the Nile and all its tributaries.”); see also
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 112
(2004) (holding that the Lanham Act requires "a showing that the defendant’s
actual practice is likely to produce confusion in the minds of consumers about the
origin of the goods or services in question") (emphasis added). According to
Dastar, the relevant goods for purposes of a claim under section 43(a) are the
physical copies that circulate in commerce and not the underlying creative works.
Id. at 37. In Dastar, that meant that the relevant question was whether consumers
would be confused about the source of the videotapes Dastar was selling.6
Dastar intended to rein in vague claims of confusion precisely like the one at
issue in this case and to make clear that valid trademark claims are predicated on
confusion about source. But rather than heeding Dastar and the other more recent
cases, the University actually urges this court to adopt a standard that goes beyond
even Boston Hockey. See Boston Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1011 (“We need not deal
here with the concept of whether every artistic reproduction of the symbol would
infringe upon plaintiff’s rights. We restrict ourselves to the emblems . . . .”).

6

See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37-38.
8

The fact that most consumers purchase New Life’s products because they
contain realistic depictions of the University’s indicia does not change this result.
In fact, this is precisely where Boston Hockey and Laite’s broad claims were
misguided: the fact that some feature is the “triggering mechanism” for purchase
does not necessarily mean others’ use of that feature is infringing. The feature at
issue must be the triggering mechanism because consumers believe the use of the
mark indicates the source of the defendant’s goods. In other words, the relevant
question is not simply “would consumers buy the painting if it did not use the
University’s marks?” It is instead “do consumers believe the defendant’s inclusion
of the features at issue suggests to consumers that the University has sponsored or
endorsed New Life’s paintings?” Cf. Order of Rainbow for Girls, 676 F.2d at 1084
(“The fact that purchasers purchased Rainbow jewelry as a direct result of the
presence of the Rainbow emblem does not compel the conclusion that they did so
believing that the jewelry was in any way endorsed, sponsored, approved or
otherwise associated with Rainbow, given the court’s findings.”); Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 322 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that intent to
profit is not the same thing as intent to confuse and stating it “[could not] assume
that the commercial success of the . . . [defendant’s] T-shirt resulted from
consumer confusion; consumers may have been moved to buy the T-shirt by the
simple fact that they were amused by the cleverness of its design.”).
9

If it were otherwise, no one could realistically depict any sporting event
without violating some teams’ trademark rights. Indeed, no one could ever depict
a trademark at all without permission. To say that a party infringes when
consumers know the mark originates with the mark owner is to say the mark owner
owns all uses of a mark in which the mark is recognizable. When a newspaper
writes about the University of Alabama, readers recognize the University’s name
as a mark of the University. By the University’s logic, it would have a prima facie
trademark claim there too. A headline that caught a fan’s attention and worked as
a “triggering mechanism” to buy a newspaper would lead to trademark liability.7
Consumer Reports magazine would be exposed to liability every time someone
bought a magazine for a branded product review.
In all these cases, the defendant could be saved only by arguing that the use
was not a “use in commerce” or that it was protected by fair use or the First
Amendment (all of which, not incidentally, are arguments the University also
rejects). The prima facie case should not be interpreted in ways that put such
pressure on these nebulous defenses.
As applied here, for Alabama to sustain a claim it must be clear that
consumers regard the presence of the Alabama marks as an indication that

7

See Southwest Recreational Industries, Inc. v. FieldTurf, No. 01-50073, 2002 WL
32783971 (5th Cir. Aug. 13, 2002); New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub.,
Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
10

Alabama is the source or sponsor of the physical copies of Moore’s works of art.
Specifically, the University of Alabama must show that Moore’s inclusion of the
Alabama marks in his paintings is likely to confuse consumers about a relationship
between Moore and the University or about the University’s sponsorship or
approval of Mr. Moore’s goods. It simply is not enough to claim that consumers
will recognize the marks as marks of the University. Nor is it enough to say that
consumers might believe the University sponsored or is affiliated with the works
simply because the uniforms appear as part of the images Moore created. Cf.
Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith System Mfg. Corp., 419 F.3d 576 , 581 (7th Cir. 2005)
(stating that, under Dastar, “[t]he right question … is whether the consumer knows
who has produced the finished product” and rejecting the plaintiff’s claim because
the purchaser of the defendant’s table knew that the defendant was the producer of
the actual, tangible product (regardless of who supplied the components of the
table).
B.

Some Confusion is Irrelevant

Even if the University could show that consumers are likely to be confused
about the source of the physical goods sold by New Life, that confusion should be
regarded as irrelevant absent some reason to think it would materially affect
consumers’ purchasing decisions. As the District Court found, Moore’s artistic
conception of his subject matter sells the works at issue. There is simply no reason

11

to think that consumers care what sort of contractual relationship, if any, New Life
has with the University, or that they would ever even think about licensing when
buying art. Confusion that has no bearing on any decisions consumers make is,
like confusion over whether Pluto is or is not a planet, not something in which the
Lanham Act should take an interest.
As the Supreme Court held in Dastar, the Lanham Act “should not be
stretched to cover matters that are typically of no consequence to purchasers.” 539
U.S. at 33. And as some courts have recognized, sponsorship or affiliation in the
context of university merchandise is unlikely to be of consequence. In Board of
Governors of the University of North Carolina v. Helpingstine, for example, the
court rejected the University of North Carolina’s claim against a t-shirt
manufacturer that sold merchandise bearing the university’s marks, stating
Given that there is a distinct possibility that individuals who buy
products from Johnny T-Shirt do not base their decision upon whether
the product is sponsored or endorsed by UNC-CH and that Plaintiffs
bear the burden of establishing likelihood of confusion, the court
holds that UNC-CH must meet its burden by showing more than
simply the identity of the marks. Instead, it must provide evidence
establishing that individuals do make the critical distinction as to
sponsorship or endorsement, or direct evidence of actual
confusion.”).
714 F. Supp. 167, 173 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
Following Dastar, this Circuit has also explicitly recognized that the
Lanham Act targets only confusion by the purchasing public, not non-purchasers,
12

because only purchasers’ confusion could cause the kind of harm that trademark
law aims to prevent. Custom Mfg. and Eng’g, 508 F.3d at 650-51; cf. id. at 652
(“We reject such a theory of infringement in a vacuum, as liability under the
Lanham Act is properly tied to the real-world context in which the alleged
trademark use occurs.”). It follows that confusion that is not tied to a purchase
decision—no matter in whose mind it exists—is equally irrelevant to the Lanham
Act.
Materiality is particularly important in cases of expressive works because it
is very likely that consumers will be motivated to purchase the work by the quality
of the artistic expression and not by their belief as to who authorized the physical
good. See Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[M]ost
theater-goers have sufficient awareness that the quality of a musical depends so
heavily on a combination of circumstances, including script, score, lyrics, cast, and
direction, that they are not likely to be significantly influenced in their ticketpurchasing decision by an erroneous belief that the musical emanated from the
same production source as the underlying work.”).
Here, in light of Moore’s own artistic reputation and his prominent use of his
name on each painting, there is simply no reason to think that consumers care what
sort of contractual relationship, if any, New Life has with the University, or that
they would even think about such a relationship when making decisions. Cf., e.g.,
13

Nabisco, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 220 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that
prominent use of the defendant’s own name diminished the chance of confusion).
Indeed there is good evidence any such confusion is irrelevant to consumers: New
Life sold unlicensed art for almost many years to no apparent harm.
Focusing on materiality also should inform the scope of relief even if the
court believes some confusion is relevant. Specifically, even if the Court
concludes that some small number of consumers may care about the University’s
relationship to Moore’s work, that concern can be addressed simply by prohibiting
New Life from making any explicit statement (such as “Officially Licensed by the
University of Alabama”) that suggests authorization. Indeed, that distinction
between licensed an unlicensed work, which New Life has diligently made, has
clearly been successful in preventing any harm for these many years.

II.

The District Court Property Held that New Life’s Works Are Protected
Works
If New Life had been offering educational services using the University of

Alabama’s name, or fielded a collegiate athletic team using the allegedly
distinctive uniform colors, the considerations in this case might be different,
though in the latter instance many other teams might have arguments of their own.
But Moore is an artist whose paintings represent an entire scene taken from reality.
14

Trademark law was not intended to prohibit artists like Moore from depicting
individuals in their work simply because those individuals are wearing
trademarked apparel. Indeed, audiences are interested in Moore’s work precisely
because they are realistic depictions of actual events.
We think the District Court rightly concluded that the University’s football
uniforms are functional as used by New Life, and that New Life’s art is protected
by a fair use defense. But whether the doctrinal tool is functionality (because
uniform colors are essential to the purpose of representing an element of the
world); aesthetic functionality (because New Life has a non-reputation-related
interest in providing a feature consumers want); nominative fair use in the spirit of
Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003); or a
First Amendment-based defense like the one in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F. 2d 994
(2d Cir. 1989), the point is the same: Trademark law recognizes that claims of
source confusion must be rejected when they interfere with substantial policies
ensuring freedom to speak or to compete.

A. The District Court Correctly Held that the University’s Marks are
Aesthetically Functional as Used by New Life

15

The District Court properly concluded that the New Life used the Alabama
colors primarily for a functional purpose.8 Moore’s intent, as the District Court
found, “was to paint interesting plays.” (Doc. 311 at 11). Painting interesting
plays in an Alabama football game necessitates depiction of Alabama football
uniforms, which serve the non-source-related function of making the painting
realistic.
As this court recognized in Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution,
LLC, 369 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2004), the Supreme Court has identified two
different types of functionality: (1) mechanical or utilitarian functionality; and (2)
aesthetic functionality. See TrafFix, 532 U.S. 23. Features are functional in the
first, utilitarian sense when they are “essential to the use or purpose of the article or
… [affect] the cost or quality of the article.” Id. at 32; Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995). Aesthetically functional features, on the
other hand, are features valued by consumers for non-source-related reasons such
that “‘exclusive use of the feature at issue would put competitors at a significant
non-reputation-related disadvantage.’’” TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33.9

8

As the University of Alabama’s uniform colors are unregistered, the University
bears the burden of proving that the claimed features are not functional. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)(3).
9
University Amici downplay TrafFix by claiming the Court’s discussion of
“aesthetic functionality” was mere dicta. University Amicus at 19, fn 7. In fact,
the distinction between utilitarian and aesthetic functionality was an important part
of the Court’s holding that competitive necessity need not be considered when the
16

Utilitarian functionality serves two purposes. “First, by ensuring that
competitors remain free to copy useful product features, it prevents the trademark
law from undermining its own pro-competitive objectives. Second, the
functionality doctrine prevents the trademark law from conflicting with the patent
law by eliminating trademark monopolies of potentially unlimited duration on a
product's utilitarian features.” See Wilhelm Pudenz, GmbH v. Littlefuse, Inc., 177
F.3d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). Aesthetic
functionality shares only one of these concerns. It is not concerned with patent law
because aesthetic functionality focuses on features that are not mechanically
necessary for the operation of the product at issue. But because it deals with
features that are necessary because of a market constraint imposed by consumer

feature is functional under the “traditional rule.” TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33. The
Sixth Circuit’s holding that the dual-spring design at issue in TrafFix was not
functional was based on its judgment that the feature was not competitively
necessary. Id. at 32 (“The Court of Appeals in the instant case seemed to interpret
this language to mean that a necessary test for functionality is ‘‘whether the
particular product configuration is a competitive necessity.’’) (citations omitted).
In reversing the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion that
competitive need was relevant once the traditional test of functionality was
established. By contrast, it made clear that the competitive need inquiry is proper
in aesthetic functionality cases. Id. at 33. Moreover, it is irrelevant whether the
University Amici agree with the Supreme Court that aesthetic functionality was the
issue in Qualitex. See University Amicus at 19, n. 7 (suggesting that TrafFix was
about the issue in Qualitex). The point is that the TrafFix Court acknowledged the
existence of both types of functionality.
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expectations,10 aesthetic functionality strongly implicates the first of the two
purposes of the utilitarian functionality doctrine. See Deere & Co. v. Farmhand,
Inc. 560 F Supp. (S.D. Iowa), aff’d, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding the color
green for farm equipment functional based upon evidence that farmers preferred
their farm equipment to be in matching colors); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c (1995) (defining features as aesthetically functional
“[w]hen aesthetic considerations play an important role in the purchasing decisions
of prospective consumers,” and a particular design feature “substantially
contributes to the aesthetic appeal of a product”). And that is why the Supreme
Court focused the inquiry in aesthetic functionality cases on the competitive effects
of exclusive use. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32-33. Aesthetic functionality therefore
considers whether consumers demand certain features such that “exclusive use [of
those features] would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage.” Id.
This court applied the lessons of TrafFix in Dippin’ Dots, finding that
the color, shape, and size of dippin' dots [have] ‘aesthetic functions’
that easily satisfy the competitive necessity test because precluding
competitors like FBD from copying any of these aspects of dippin'
dots would eliminate all competitors in the flash-frozen ice cream
10

As in fact utilitarian functionality is ultimately dependent on consumer desires.
No object is functional unless a consumer wants to do something with it: even a
wheel only has value because people want to use it, which is why roller skates can
be functional even if there are more efficient, safer, and more pleasant ways to
travel.
18

market, which would be the ultimate non-reputation-related
disadvantage.
Dippin’ Dots, 369 F.3d at 1203 n. 7. And while the shape and size of dippin’ dots
could be viewed as mechanically functional, ice cream colors are functional purely
in the aesthetic sense. Dippin’ Dots’ color code was based on flavor, and certain
flavors generally are denoted with particular colors. But coloring of the flashfrozen ice cream was not compelled by its ingredients or the method by which it
was made. In fact, the coloring is completely artificial, so there is no reason the
defendant could not have made its strawberry-flavored ice cream purple.11 The
defendant’s need to use pink was purely a function of consumer expectations: a
substantial number of consumers want their strawberry-flavored ice cream to be
pink.
Inability to use Alabama’s uniform colors would put New Life at a similarly
significant, non-reputation-related disadvantage. Indeed, the fact that most
consumers purchase New Life’s products because they contain realistic depictions
of the Alabama football uniforms actually demonstrates New Life’s competitive
need. As the University emphasizes, if New Life were to make the University’s
jerseys purple, Alabama fans would not want them. See Brief of Appellee/Cross-

11

For this reason University Amici are wrong when they claim, contrary to the
express language of the decision, “color shape and size of the flash-frozen ice
cream beads at issue did not serve ‘aesthetic functions’ but utilitarian ones.”
University Amicus at 15, note 4.
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Appellant at 29. But consumers wouldn’t want a painting of a purple Statue of
Liberty, and for the same reason: consumers want realistic depictions of realworld things, and neither the Statue of Liberty nor the University of Alabama’s
uniforms are purple. Other colors simply are no substitute for accurately depicting
Alabama’s Crimson and White, and it is accurate depiction, rather than source
identification, over which the University here seeks a monopoly.12
This is precisely the understanding of competitive necessity that motivated
this court in Dippin’ Dots, where, in rejecting the claim that the defendant had
other design features available to it, this court said:
DDI's argument that FBD could still compete in the ice cream market
by producing, e.g., soft-serve ice cream, which would not have many
of the same functional elements as dippin' dots and thus would not
infringe upon DDI's product trade dress, is unavailing. FBD does not
want to compete in the ice cream business; it wants to compete in the
flash-frozen ice cream business, which is in a different market from
more traditional forms of ice cream.
369 F.3d at 1204. In the same way, New Life could have used different colors.
But if it did so, it would have been selling a different product. Fans of Alabama
football want pictures of Alabama football players, and it is cold comfort to say
that New Life can sell pictures of non-Alabama football players. See Publ’ns Int’l,

12

This point is further established by the District Court’s finding that “the plays
and Moore’s reputation established during a period when his art was agreeably not
licensed are what predominantly trigger the sales” of his paintings. (Doc. 311 at
7). Barring him from depicting reality would hamper his ability to use his own
talents and reputation to produce art.
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Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 342 (7th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the plaintiff’s
claim that the allegedly infringing cookbooks' pages could have been gilded a color
other than gold, which was the color of the plaintiff's cookbooks' gilded pages,
because “[g]old connotes opulence” and is “a natural color to use on a fancy
cookbook”).13
The University, and University Amici, seek to avoid this conclusion by
arguing that any disadvantage New Life would suffer if it was not entitled to use
Alabama’s team colors are reputation-related. See University Amicus at 13-14.
But this argument mischaracterizes the role of “reputation” here. When the
Supreme Court said that the functionality doctrine protects competitors only
against a “non-reputation-related” disadvantage, it did not mean that the features at
issue could not evoke a mark holder or its reputation. Every use of a mark that
consumers recognize as a reference to the mark holder implicates reputation in this
sense. The “reputation” that matters is a reputation as a source of goods or
services. "

13

In fact the plaintiff in Dippin Dots argued, and this Court rejected, an argument
specifically about colors that was much like the one the University presses here.
Dippin’ Dots claimed that, even if the defendant needed to use certain colors
generally, it did not need to copy the “identical Pantone color” used by Dippin
Dots. The court expressly rejected that argument. Dippin’ Dots, 369 F.3d at 1205
n.9. This too was consistent with the Supreme Court’s instruction in TrafFix that,
once a feature is functional, alternative design possibilities need not be considered.
See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33-34
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The relevant question is whether the disadvantage that New Life would
suffer if it could not depict the University’s marks relates to an attempt to benefit
from the reputation of the University by using its mark to indicate the source of
artistic goods or whether instead the disadvantage would flow from New Life’s
inability to engage in expression unrelated to indicating the source of the goods.
And the proper focus here is on the role those features play as used by New
Life. Some courts have misunderstood this and have refused to find aesthetic
functionality when the defendant has made use of a feature that unambiguously
serves as a trademark when used to denote the plaintiff’s goods or services on the
theory the aesthetic function cannot be separated from source indication. See, e.g.,
Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. College v. Smack Apparel
Co., 550 F.3d 465, 486 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2759 (2009)
(affirming the District Court’s holding that the plaintiff universities’ color
schemes, logos, and designs had no significance other than to identify the
Universities and were therefore nonfunctional); Automotive Gold, Inc. v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1282 (2007) (refusing to declare plaintiff’s logo functional when used to
adorn a key chain, even while recognizing that “[c]onsumers sometimes buy
products bearing marks such as the Nike Swoosh, the Playboy bunny ears, the
Mercedes tri-point star, the Ferrari stallion, and countless sports franchise logos,
22

for the appeal of the mark itself, without regard to whether it signifies the origin or
sponsorship of the product.”).
These decisions miss the mark because they focus on the role the features at
issue play when used by the plaintiffs as an indicator of the source of their
products. The fact that a product feature is non-functional in some contexts,
however, does not necessarily mean that the feature is non-functional for all
purposes. The aesthetic functionality doctrine, at its core, is concerned about the
consequences of giving one party exclusive rights to a feature that may harm
others' ability to offer products with features that consumers want. Where the
plaintiff and defendant compete directly, the consequence of a finding of aesthetic
functionality will be to bar trademark protection for the feature altogether. See
Deere, 560 F.Supp. 85. But this will not always be so: the defendant in a
particular case might need access to a particular feature for a different reason than
the plaintiff, leaving the trademark perfectly valid in its primary market, but
functional within the context of the defendant's use. See Rosetta Stone, Ltd. v.
Google, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00736-GBL-TCB slip. op. (E.D. Va. August 3, 2010)
(finding Google's particular use of trademarked keywords as triggers for paid
advertisements functional even though the terms clearly operated as trademarks for
the plaintiff’s goods). It is the defendant's non-source-related need, in such cases,
that triggers the aesthetic functionality doctrine. When, as here, the defendant is
23

depicting a mark as part of a larger work depicting real-life events, the
information-conveying function of the use can readily be distinguished from a
source or sponsorship message.
At bottom, the University’s functionality argument, like its argument
regarding relevant confusion, boils down to a simple contention that New Life’s
ability to use the colors of Alabama’s football uniforms allows New Life to gain a
benefit for which the University would charge a licensing fee if it could.14 But this
circular claim to a licensing market does not justify the right they seek. See
generally, Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 Mich. L.
Rev. __ (forthcoming 2010) (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1604845). Where, as here,
the trademark is used by the defendant primarily as a desirable feature of a product
rather than to indicate the source of its own goods, “competition suffers – and
consumers pay – if other sellers are shut out of the market for that feature.”15

14

The University’s professed concern for its image is certainly not evident in its
licensed rivalry figurines showing arch-enemy Auburn humiliating the Tide
mascot, uniforms, and colors. See http://www.elitedeals.com/mem-col-au-072400.html (uniforms); http://www.elitedeals.com/mem-col-au-051-400.html
(mascot wearing uniform: "It is hand painted in team colors and, as you can see,
show the mascot squeezing the rival mascot for all he's worth. See how scared that
other mascot looks? Now that's funny.");
http://www.footballfanatics.com/COLLEGE_Auburn_Tigers/Auburn_Tigers_Crun
chtime_Rivalry_Figurine (Tide colors). Many of the University Amici license
similarly humiliating treatments, available for purchase at the same sites.
15
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory
or Fait Accompli?, 54 Emory L.J. 461, 465 (2004)
24

B.

The District Court Properly Held New Life’s Paintings Are Protected
Expression

Amici are in agreement with Amici Curiae American Society of Media
Photographers, Inc. and Alabama Press Association that the University’s position
puts the Lanham Act in needless conflict with the First Amendment. We therefore
only add the following observations: Broad claims to control untethered from
material confusion regarding the source of goods or services pose particular risks
to free expression. In fact, while all aspects of trademark law can pose First
Amendment threats, it is no accident that the worst problems don’t come from
traditional suits against the sale of competing products, but rather from claims that
try to stretch the concept of confusion to cover creative works by using the rubric
of sponsorship or affiliation.
With the importance of brand image in today’s economy, trademarks “form
an important part of the public dialog on economic and social issues.”16 Restricting
this speech is harmful to society. As Judge Kozinski has noted, “[m]uch useful
social and commercial discourse w[ill] be all but impossible if speakers [are] under
threat of an infringement lawsuit every time they ma[k]e reference to a person,
16. 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:146; see also
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1987)
(“‘[T]rademarks offer a particularly powerful means of conjuring up the image of
their owners, and thus become an important, perhaps at times indispensable, part of
the public vocabulary.’” (quoting Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks As Speech:
Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade
Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 195-96)).
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company or product by using its trademark.”17 And this is the natural consequence
of the University’s claim. If the University can control an artistic depiction of an
event in which its players participated, then it can make the same arguments to
control uses of its name, images of its players, images of its buildings, or any other
indicia that serve to identify the subject matter of an informational or artistic work.
There are good reasons that the subjects of discourse are not allowed to
decide how they will be shown or spoken of, outside the heavily regulated
boundaries of defamation and privacy law. The First Amendment barred Jerry
Falwell from suppressing a depiction of himself that he found humiliating, see
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), and the First Amendment
likewise protects even more favorable depictions from more subtle censorship. As
Doc. 255, Exhibit 20 shows, an artist producing a University-licensed work would
be subject to NCAA regulations, which require changing players’ names and
fictionalizing history. An artist’s freedom to choose to produce a more realistic
representation should not be subject to the constraints the University has put on its
own depictions. Cf. CBC Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major League
Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that the First
Amendment trumps ownership claims over facts regarding baseball players).
17. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir.
1992); see also Yankee Publ’g Inc. v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267,
275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that the First Amendment is implicated by
expressive, rather than commercial, uses of a trademark).
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III.

Conclusion
Amici respectfully submit to the Court that, for the foregoing reasons, New

Life Art’s realistic depiction Alabama football games cannot give rise to a claim
under the Lanham Act.

_____________________________________
Michael T. Sansbury
SPOTSWOOD SANSOM & SANSBURY LLC
940 Concord Center
2100 Third Avenue North
Birmingham, AL 35203
Counsel of Record
Mark P. McKenna
Notre Dame Law School
P.O. Box 780
Notre Dame, IN 46556

27

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Rule 32(a)(7)(C) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
the undersigned certifies that:
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of FED. R. APP. P.
29(d) and 32(a)(7)(B) because this brief contains 6,501 words, excluding the
parts of the brief exempted by FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii), as
determined by the word processing system used to generate the brief.
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of FED. R. APP. P.
32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(6)
because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface
using Microsoft Office Word 2007 in Times New Roman font, 14 point.
Dated: August 5, 2010

____________________________
Michael T. Sansbury
SPOTSWOOD SANSOM & SANSBURY LLC
940 Concord Center
2100 Third Avenue North
Birmingham, AL 35203
Counsel of Record

28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I filed the foregoing BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PROFESSORS IN SUPPORT OF NEW
LIFE ART, INC. AND DANIEL MOORE AND IN SUPPORT OF
AFFIRMANCE, IN PART on August 5, 2010, by sending the original and six (6)
copies thereof by Federal Express to:
Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
I further certify that I served the foregoing BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PROFESSORS IN SUPPORT OF NEW
LIFE ART, INC. AND DANIEL MOORE AND IN SUPPORT OF
AFFIRMANCE, IN PART on August 5, 2010 by sending a copy thereof by
Federal Express Ground, in a sealed envelope, to the address of each counsel, as
listed below:

Jerre B. Swann
KILPATRICK STOCKTON LLP
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309-4530

Stephen D. Heninger
HENINGER GARRISON & DAVIS,
LLC
2224 First Avenue North
Birmingham, AL 35203
(205) 326-3336
Fax: (205) 326-3332

Walter William Bates
STARNES DAVIS FLORIE LLP
Seventh Floor
100 Brookwood Place
P.O. Box 598512
Birmingham, Alabama 35209

Susan J. Hightower
PIRKEY BARBER LLP
600 Congress Avenue, Suite 2120
Austin, Texas 78701

____________________________
Counsel of Record

29

